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The nationalism of Calhoun. 
John*Calhoun has won his place in American history as 
the chief advocate of State Rights, and to the person who 
has not read beyond the ordinary school texts, he does not 
present any tendencies toward what may he called national-
ism, A superficial study of the South Carolina trouble of 
1832 often causeB the opinion to prevail that Calhoun and 
his followers wanted to destroy the Constitution when in 
fact they were standing for the Constitution as they under-
stood it. There were few people in the United States who 
did not venerate the Constitution as they understood it, 
Webster and Calhoun worshipped that great document but ev-
ery student of history knows that both men were diametric-
ally opposed to each other in the interpretation of its pro-
visions, especially regarding a strong central government 
and the sovereignty of the states. It is the purpose of 
this thesis to bring out the national traits of Mr. Calhoun te 
political career, 
From the very beginning of our National Government undex*-
the Constitution there were two parties. One party favored 
a broad construction of the Constitution so that the Govern-
ment could do many things not specifically spoken of in the 
provisions of that instrument, and in justice to that school 
it may be said that they did not want to do anything more 
2 
"than strong governments "had done "before ours came into ex-
istence. The other party desired to adhere to the strict 
letter of the Constitution. They were jealous of the lib-
erties guaranteed there, and they knew that if there was 
much reading between the lines there would probably be no 
Tialt in the march toward a strong central government. In 
short, they were anxious lest the reserved powers of the 
states should be little by little reduced. This conflict of 
opinion came out in the question of the Alien and Sedition 
Xaws, and caused the States Rights Strict Construction Party 
to formulate its views in a more tangible form in the Ken-
tucky and Virginia Resolutions. The jeffersonian party 
then was directly opposed to the program of the party in 
power before 1801 because it was believed that the federal-
ist party had usurped powers for the General Government and 
that it was leading away from the most excellent system 
provided for in that compact so-called —The Constitution 
of the United States. 
In 1801, Mr. Jefferson and his party came into power. 
"A condition and not a theory" confronted them, and such 
has been the case with every strict construction adminis-
tration since that time. Practice has revealed that the gen-
eral Government of necessity must sometimes deviate from 
the strict interpretation idea if it is to maintain any dig-
3 
nity at all or any force. A written document cannot provide 
for everything or foresee every emergency, however keen and 
intelligent the author*s of that instrument may have been. 
The Republicans from 1801 to 1825 were always respectful to 
strict construction whenever it was possible, but Strict 
Construction ideas did not prevent Jefferson from purchasing 
Louisiana or the establishment of a United States Bank in 
1816. 
The Federalists after their dismissal from power critic-
ized the Democratic-Republicans for policies contrary to the 
Constitution, and in many respects they became the party of 
Strict Construction. By 1812 the Democratic-Republican parly-
was the great national party and it was drawing to itself 
the young blood of the nation. Under its fule the country 
had extended its boundaries and the interests of the people 
were directed to foreign affairs and an approaching war with 
either Great Britain or France. When Calhoun entered Cong-
ress in 1811, there was no absorbing tariff or slavery quest-
ion to divide the country into sections. The chief politic-
al issues were binding the people into one nation united 
against foreign aggression. 
When Calhoun entered Congress he was placed on the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations and there he did admirable ser-
vice. It was the general belief that more trouble was in-
evitable for the United States, and that some preparations 
4 
ought to he made by increasing the army and war equipment of 
the nation. The Committee on Foreign Relations had reported 
a resolution which favored an increase in the army and on 
Dec. 12, 1811, Calhoun delivered a speech favoring the res-
olution. He said: "Which shall we do, abandon or defend 
our own commercial and maritime rights, and the personal 
liberties of our citizens employed in exercising them? These 
rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of 
redress." 1 In this speech Calhoun's nationalism is appar-
ent and one would never suspect that he would in the future 
support "Nullification." 
There was much opposition to the Smbargo and this op-
position was shown in part by a petition of the citizens of 
Albany to repyr*eal that measure. Their reference was to the 
Sixty-day Embargo of April 4, 1812. Mr. Calhoun, although 
opposed to the Restrictive System as a principle favored 
this temporary Smbargo because he considered it a measure 
preliminary to war, and in closing his address he said, 
"Sir, I assert it with confidence, a war, just and necessary 
in its origin, wisely and vigorously carried on, and honor-
ably terminated, would establish the integrity and prosper-
ity of our country for centuries." He characterized the 
2 
struggle as the second struggle for our liberty. 
lZ Calhoun1 s Works, Vol. 2, pp. 1-13. 
2. Calhoun*s Works, Vol. 2, PP. 13-20. 
5 
On May 29, 1812 Representative John Randolph of Virginia 
-who opposed Calhoun so often, submitted the following prop-
osition; "That under present circumstances, it is inexped-
3 
lent to resort to a war with Great Britain," This resolu-
tion was defeated and Calhoun's vote helped do it. Consist-
ent with his previous acts and professions, Calhoun voted 
for the Declaration of War against Great Britain. In pur-
suing this course he was supported by his own state and the 
country at large. While the war was in progress, the Leg-
islature of South Carolina passed two resolutions showing 
its attitude toward the administration of James Madison, and 
the settlement of the difficulty with England. The resolu-
tions said that James Madison had by his energetic prosecu-
tion of the war furnished a new claim to the confidence of 
Has fellow citizens and that indemnity for our wrongs and 
satisfactory security for our rights as a nation were the 
4 
only terms on which an honorable peace could be bottomed. 
The Administration received unqualified support from John 
Calhoun and his native state as far as the prosecution of 
the war with England was concerned. Yet the Administration 
and Calhoun did not always agree on details as will be shown 
later. Calhoun was always proud of his course in that mem-
orable war and he was always pleased to speak of it in years 
3. Niles Register, Vol. 2, P. 235, 
4. tfiles Register, Vol. 5, p. 357. 
6 
after. His record in that respect was a political asset to 
him* The legislature of South Carolina gave that as one of 
5 
its reasons for supporting him for president. He opposed 
the almost disloyal Federalists for their course in that 
war although they went no further, if as far, as South Car-
olina was to go in 1832. War is a good test of fidelity 
to a government hut it does no prove so much in the case 
of Calhoun as far as his belief in the principles of Nat-
ionalism is concerned. It would have been possible for him 
to adhere to the theory of state rights and yet be a strong 
nationalist on the question of war. The constitution of 
the United States gives Congress plain and definite power 
to declare war. There is no question or doubt about it such 
as there was in connection with the protective tariff, Un-
ited States Hank or Internal Improvements. These questions 
presented themselves for solution as soon as the war was 
over. 
The Restrictive System had caused capital to seek other 
channels than commerce. As a result manufacturing had large-
increased. The Restrictive System was a war measure in its 
nature and as soon as the war was over the manufacturers 
were anxious to know what was going to be done to prevent 
British goods from flooding the country. In other words, 
5. Niles 1 Register, Vol. 25, p, 243. 
7 
there was the tariff problem. In 1811 the United States 
failed to recharter the United States Bank because of the 
prevailing prejudice against it. Many feared the bugaboo of 
British gold, and preferred to get along without a bank and 
leave the matter to the states. The war, however, showed a 
need for a good banking institution that would insure safe-
ty and uniformity. There was then a bank question. People 
were beginning to redognize the utility of good roads for 
purposes of quick communication and travel. A war will al-
ways bring to light the defects or good qualities of a 
country in the matter of connminication. Then trade was de-
veloping. Consequently there was the problem of internal 
improvements. What was Calhoun's position on these ques-
tions? 
Calhoun desired to get rid of the Restrictive System as 
soon as possible. This Restrictive System (i.e. Embargo 
and Non-Intercourse) was a policy of the Administration, 
and was one of its favorite maasures. Under certain condi-
tions he favored the enforcement of the Uon-Importation Act 
as a war measure and further he wanted it enforced if it 
6 
was to remain law but on April, 1814, he came out against 
the system in a speech delivered on the sixth of that month. 
6« Annals of Congress, 12th Congress, 2nd Seas ion,p 
1111. 
8 
He was still chairman of the Committee of foreign Relations 
and his words naturally would carry great weight. He favored 
the repeal of the Restricting System. The circumstances 
had changed for all Europe was now open to England. Suppose 
we were to persist in the measure, does anyone believe that 
England will feel the policy as she did when the Continent 
was shut? Certainly not. He believed that we should attach 
the friendship of Russia, Sweden, Holland, Denmark and of 
all other nations who have a deep interest in free trade, 
to the cause of America* F© favored protection for the man-
ufacturing interests and he hoped they would be protected 
7 
with care. This was the tenor of his speech and this with 
other remarks on the tariff caused Mr. Calhoun to make some 
explanations of his stand on that question when he was bus-
ily engaged in fighting the Teriffs of 1828 and 1833. 
On April 6, 1816—just two years after the foregoing 
address, Calhoun delivered in the House of Representatives, 
a speech on the new Tariff Bill. He still favored Protec-
tion but I do not doubt that he meant a mild protection and 
not the protection advocated by the friends of the so-called 
"American system" which was later fathered by Henry Clay. 
Mr. Calhoun realized that we were entering on a new era. He 
7. ffiles Register, Vol. 6, p. 122. 
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"believed that manufacturing would excite an increased at-
tention to Internal Improvements and bind our country closer 
together,8 I "believe that his position on the Tariff was 
correct and that he was right in wishing to repeal the re-
strictive legislation which really acted as an extremely 
9 
high protective tariff. This in itself would show that 
Calhoun would not favor a high protective tariff. He was 
in his early days a friend of moderate protection. The 
heavy debt contracted during the war made it necessary that 
10 
the duties be on an average of about twenty per cent. 
South Carolina as well as most of the south, which was not 
a manufacturing state and which gave no particular promise 
of becoming one, gave her support to the tariff of 1816. Mr. 
Calhoun in a speech delivered Feb. 15, 1833, did not deny 
that he had given his support to the Tariff of 1816, but he 
said that he did it on the ground that it was a tariff for 
revenue and not for protection. He denied that he was the 
author of the protective system. He said in this same speech. 
"I came into congress in 1812, devoted friend and supporter 
of the then administration, yet one of my first efforts was 
to brave the administration by opposing its favorite meas-
ure, the restrictive system embargo, non-intercourse, and 
all and that upon the principle of free trade. The system 
Wl Calhoun»s works, Vol. 2, pp. 163-173, 
9. Taussig*s Tariff History, p. 17. 
10. Taussig's Tariff History, p. 19. 
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remained in fashion for a time, but after the overthrow of 
Bonaparte, I reported a bill from the Committee on Foreign 
Relations to repeal the whole system of restrictive measures 
While the bill was under consideration a worthy man, then a 
member of the House (Mr* M»Kan\of Baltimore) moved to ex-
cept the non-importation Act, which he supported on the 
ground of encouragement 4o manufacturers. I resisted the 
motion on the very grounds on which Mr. M»Kim supported it. 
I maintained that the manufacturers were then receiving too 
much protection, and warned its friends that the withdrawal 
of the protection which the war and the high duties then af-
forded would cause great embarrassment, and that the true 
policy, in the meantimei was to admit foreign goods as free-
ly as possible in order to diminish the anticipated embar-
rassment on the return of peace; intimating at the same 
time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a/view of af-
fording a moderate and permanent protection. Such was my 
conduct before 1816. 1 , 1 1 
Of course Mr. Calhoun could have justified his stand on 
the tariff on the principle of a tariff for revenue only be-
cause as was said before, the government had contracted a 
large debt during the war and needed the money to pay the 
interest on the debt. Men who believe in free trade have 
11. Calhoun's works, Vol. 2, p. 211. 
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to alter their principles to suit the circumstances just as 
protectionists would have to do under certain conditions. 
Professor Taussig says in speaking of the Tariff of 1816, 
"The control of the policy of Congress at that time was in 
the hands of a knot of young men of the rising generation, 
who brought about the war and felt in a measure responsible 
for its results. There was a strong feeling among these 
that the manufacturing establishments which had grown up 
during the war should be assisted. There was little feel-
ing however, either in Congress or among the people, such 
as appeared in later years, in favor of a permanent strong 
protective policy. These and some other distinctly pro-
tective provisions were defended by Calhoun, mainly on the 
ground of the need of making provision for the exigencies 
of another war; and on that ground they were adopted, and 
12 
at the same time limited." i.e. in time. 
Whether one calls Calhoun a friend of free trade or a 
protectionist, he was not at this time so wedded to one view 
that he could not adjust himself to the conditions. He had 
national spirit enough to realize that the finances of the 
(federal government could not suffer, and he was patriotic 
enough to consider other sections besides his own state. 
Mr. Hunt quotes Calhoun as saying in his first speech in 
12. Taussig«s Tariff History, p. 18. 
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Congress, "I am not here to represent my own state alone, I 
renounce the idea, and I will show "by my vote, that I con-
tend for the interests of the whole people of this commun-
ity." The people of south Carolina undoubtedly did not 
fear any harm from that schedule of duties and it was not 
until about 1818 that Calhoun's state became uneasy over 
the increasing demands of protectionists. 
After the war of 1812 the financial affairs of the na-
tion were in a bad condition. The country was burdened 
with a war debt, and commerce and trade were crippled for 
the lack of specie. Sentiment was now changing in regard 
to a United States Bank and in the year following the war a 
bill was passed by Congress to reestablish the Bank of the 
United States, but the President not being satisfied with t 
the measure, vetoed it and the question was left open for f 
further debate, There was much talk about the consitution-
ality of a bank. On Feb. 3, 1814, Calhoun proposed the 
following motion^ "Resolved, That the Committee of Ways and 
Means be instructed to inquire into the expediency of estah 
lishing a National Bank, to be located in the District of 
14 
Columbia." Calhoun believed that a bank in the District 
of Columbia was undoubtedly constitutional. But the bank 
13. Hunt's Calhoun, p. 24, 
14. ffiles Register, Vol. 5, pp. 403-404. 
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issue was not finally disposed of till 1816. Mr. Calhoun 
was opposed to paper money as the only money, and he was a-
larmed at the monetary condition of the Nation. In a speech 
delivered Feb. 26, 1816, on the Bill to establish a National 
Bank, he said that the power was given to Congress by the 
Constitution in express terms to regulate the currency of 
the United States. "In point of fact," he said, "that power 
through given to Congress is not in their hands. Gold 
and silver have disappeared entirely. There is no money but 
paper money, and that money is beyond the control of Cong-
ress." He said that the states could not regulate this de-
preciated paper currency for this power was intended to be 
given exclusively to Congress. He admitted there was no 
provision in the constitution by which the states were pro-
hibited from creating banks, A National Bank would bring 
uniformity in many ways, "What was a bank? An institution 
under present uses, to make money. What was the instinct 
of such an institution? Gain, gain, nothing but gain. 
Banks must change their nature," He went on to say that 
the banks kave in a great measure a control over the press, 
for pro#f of which he referred to the fact that the present 
wretched state of the circulating medium had scarcely been 
15 
denounced by a single paper within the United States. 
15, Calhoun's works, Vol. 2, PP. 153-162. 
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Since 1811 the Banking business had been in the hands 
of the states and one can imagine how impossible it was to 
have uniformity without some definite understanding among 
all the states. This point cauld be reached only through 
the medium of the National Government. Mr. Calhoun saw this 
and desired to put the country on a sound financial basis, 
and he believed that a national Bank could help bring about 
this sta<ie. He believed that there was a constitutional 
method of establishing a United States Bank. He went fur-
ther than Mr. Jefferson went in 1791 when the first United 
States Bank was established. Mr. Jefferson considered the 
measure as unconstitutional but in times of necessity the 
party of Jefferson had changed its position in regard to 
the Bank and Mr. Calhoun's Nationalism was great enough to 
see that implied power was given to Congress to establish 
such an institution. Mr. Calhoun was not yet making fine 
distinctions. He was very practical in his views concerning 
the implied powers of Congress. In fact, as will appear 
later, he was far more liberal in some of his views than 
many members of his own political party. 
The Bank Bill passed the House of Representatives March 
14, 1816, by a vote of 80 to 71. Calhoun and Clay supported 
it while Randolph and Webster opposed the measure. A large 
majority of the Republican party voted for the Bill, influ-
enced no doubt by the peculiar circumstances of the time. 
Calhoun as chairman of the Committee of the Currency in 1816 
was the supporter of the measure which established a Bank 
with a capital of 135,000,000 and to him must be given a 
large share of the credit in placing the nation on a good 
monetary basis, 
Calhoun showed himself a broad constructionist in his 
support of Internal Improvements. The record shows that he 
went beyond the views of Madison in that respect. Both Fed-
eralists and Republicans desired to see our country improved 
but two things generally caused agitation--expense and con-
stitutionality. Only the parsimonious were frightened at 
the former and probably many used the latter as a shield a-
gainst spending money for internal improvements, but many 
men seriously doubted that congress had the power to make 
such improvements. 
When the government rechartered the United States Bank, 
it reserved one fifth of the stock for itself, consequently 
the Government would get dividends from this stock. How was 
this money to be spent? A bill was introduced to set aside 
the Bank Dividends and bonus as a permanent fund for the 
construction of roads and canals, Mr. Calhoun gave his sup-
port to this measure and on Febr. 4, 1817, he delivered an 
address on the subject in the House of Representatives. In 
16 
part he said: "Thus situated, to what can we direct our 
resources and attention more important than internal im-
provements, what can add more to the wealth, the strength, 
and the political prosperity of our country? In fact if 
we look into the nature of wealth we will find that nothing 
can he more favorable to its growth than good roads and can-
als. Let it not be said that internal improvements may be 
wholly left to the enterprise of the states and of individ-
uals, let us then bind the republic together with a perfect 
system of roads and canals." Calhoun goes on to say that 
such improvements will help keep us from disunion. He sees 
no constitutional obstacles. He desired to see perfect com-
munication from Main to Louisiana. He also wanted to see 
16 
the Lakes connected with the Hudson River. 
Calhoun evidently recognized the national importance of 
roads and canals. They were not merely local and state af-
fairs, while Calhoun was later forced to take somewhat 
different ground on the constitutionality of Internal Im-
provements, especially after 1825, he never lost sight of 
their often being too great for any one state to handle, 
and he never reached the point, as far as I have been able 
to discover, where he denied the right of the Central Gov-
ernment to support and control internal improvements of a 
16. Calhoun's works, Vol. 2, PP. 186-196. 
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certain nature and magnitude. 
As late as Nov. 13, 1845, he said on taking the chair 
of the Southwestern Convention at Memphis that he favored 
the proper development of the Mississippi River as a chan-
nel of commerce, and he said that the Mississippi and its 
tributaries whould be under the supervision of the General 
Government. He said that it was too great a task for the 
states. As for railroads the power of the General govern-
ment was more questionable. "The General Government has no 
right to appropriate money except to carry into execution 
its delegated powers and that I do not regard the system 
of railroads or Internal Improvements as comprehended 
under them. The General Government may grant lands (altern-
ate sections for example) in aid of such improvements." He 
said he had voted for such grants in Congress, "Acting on 
that principle, I cheerfully, as President of the Senate, 
gave the casting vote in favor of an act granting alternate 
sections to the canal intended to connect Lake Miehigan with 
17 
the Mississippi through the Illinois River." 
In 1831, in a letter dated port Hill, Aug. 5, Calhoun 
wrote to Christopher Van Deventer that he had no doubt of 
the great importance of the subject of Internal Improvements 
and within proper limits its constitutionality; but he 
17, Calhoun's Works, Vol. 6, pp. 273-284, 
18 
thought experience had abundantly shown that the system 
could not stand on a solid, or satisfactory basis without 
the insertion of an express provision authorizing its exer-
18 
cise and guarding against its abuses. 
The bill of 1817 entitled "An Act to set apart and pled® 
certain funds for internal improvements" was passed by 
Congress but it was vetoed by President Madison the day be-
fore he left the Presidential chair, March 3, 1817. The 
House reconsidered it and Calhoun voted to pass the measure 
19 
over the President's yeto, but it failed to pass; This 
wvent shows Calhoun's ardor for internal improvements in 
the early days of his public career and his apparent indif-
ference to fine constitutional objections or strict cons-
trustion. 
In 1817 Calhoun became Secretary of War in the Adminis-
tration of Mr. Monroe. His new position made him even more 
aware of good highways of commerce and travel. On Jan. 14, 
1819, his report on Roads and Canals was communicated to 
the House of Representatives. In part this report said: "A 
judicious system of roads and canals, constructed for the 
convenience of commerce, and the transportation of the mail 
only, without any reference to military operations, is itaeT 
among the most efficient means for the more complete defense 
18. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 296-297. 
19, Niles Register, Vol. 12, pp. 25-26. 
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of the United States. n He went on to say: There is no 
country to which a good system of military roads and canals 
is more indispensable than to the United States•N The next 
sentences I have noted shows that Calhoun made a distinc-
tion between local and national improvements. "Much un-
doubtedly remains to be done to perfect the roads and im-
prove the navigation of the rivers but this for the most 
part may be safely left to the states, and the commercial 
cities particularly interested, as the appropriate objects 
of their care and exertions." ... "Very different is the 
case with the great and important line of communication, ex 
tending along the coast, through the Atlantic States. Ho 
object of the kind is more important and there is none to 
which state or individual capacity is more inadequate. It 
must be perfected by the General Government or not be per-
fected at all, at least for many years." In this report 
Calhoun declined to discuss the constitutional question. 20 
In 1845, in the speech before the Memphis Convention he 
believed the General Government could help indirectly by 
granting alternate sections of land to railroads under con-
struction but it must be remembered that many years before 
that convention he had come to the conclusion that an amend-
ment <fco the Constitution was necessary to place internal im-
20, tfiles Register, Vol, 16, p. 186. 
20 
provements by the General Government on a solid and perm-
anent basis. 
Calhoun's time was now consumed in the duties of Sec-
retary of War and by reading his reports and letters it is 
clear that he was moved by a broad national spirit in his 
work in the war Department. In a speech delivered jan. 31, 
1816, on the motion to repeal the Direct Tax, a motion which 
Calhoun opposed because the Government needed the money) he 
uttered many sentiments which characterized the spirit of 
his work as Secretary in his department. He prophesied 
trouble with England and he advocated an adequate navy to 
defend our country. He desired the improvement of the mil-
itia and the extension of their term of service. He said, 
they were "the true force of the country." He believed our 
coast ought to be fortified and he advocated the establish-
ment of roads and canals. They could be used for military 
21 
purposes. This address would indicate that Calhoun was 
the man to fill the important place he occupied in the Cab-
inet of Monroe. It was under his administration that the 
Military Academy at West Point was put on a solid foundation. 
It was while he was in that position that slavery began 
to assume a somewhat prophetic form, yet it did not occupy 
his mind very much in a public way. If he had been in Cong-
21. Calhoun's Works, Vol. 2, pp. 135-153. 
21 
res 8 there is no doubt but that he would have made at least 
one important speech on the subject of the Missouri Comp-
romise. That the contest in Congress gave him some concern 
is shown in a letter to John Swing Calhoun under date of 
jan. 8, 1821. "I still hope" he wrote, "Missouri will be 
admitted before the end of the session and that a question 
which has so deeply agitated this country will be settled 
0 22 
forever. Nevertheless the Missouri Question seems to have 
dampened Calhoun's enthusiastic optimism with respect to 
the future of the Union. In the conversations which he had 
about this time with John Quincy Adams, who was Secretary 
of State, he exhibits for the first time a certain depres-
sion and uneasiness. He apparently saw that a change was' 
coming. He was not alone in his alarm for Mr. Adams him-
self was uneasy lest the life of the Union should be soon 
23 
destroyed. The following incident exemplifies this spirit. 
On February 24, 1820, Mr. Adams had some conversation 
with Calhoun on the slave question pending in Congress. Mr. 
Calhoun said he did not think it would produce a dissolu-
tion of the Union, but if it should the South would be from 
necessity compelled to form an alliance offensive and def-
ensive with Great Britain. Mr. Adams said that would be 
returning to the colonial state. He said yes, pretty much, 
22. Galhoun's Correspondence, p. 181* 
23. Mams Memoirs, Vol. 4, p. 495. 
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"but it would be forced upon them. Adams asked him whether 
he though, if by the effect of this alliance, offensive and 
defensive, the population of the North should be cut off 
from its natural outlet upon the ocean, it would fall back 
upon its rocks bound hand and foot to starve or whether it 
would not retain its powers of locomotion to move southward 
by land. Then he said, they would find it necessary to 
make their communities all military. Adams pressed the con-
24 
versation no further but it led him into deep reflection. 
The slavery question was causing all thougbtful men to 
# 
be concerned. But that Calhoun was not very strict in his 
interpretation of the Constitution is shown by the answer 
to Monroe's question whether Congress could prohibit slavery 
in the territories, Calhoun believed that Congress had 
that authority to exclude slavery from the territories al-
though he could not (according to Mr. Adams) find any ex-
press power to that effect in the constitution. The Sec-
retary of War was a slave-holder, and this opinion expressed 
in Monroe's Cabinet shows that Calhoun was not yet convinced 
that slavery would assume the importance it finally obtained 
in his later life. He evidently believed that congress 
# Calhoun favored the Missouri compromise. 
24. Adams' Memoirs, Vol. 4, pp. 530-531. 
25. Adams1 Memoirs, Vol. 5, pp. 4-9. 
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had the power to keep slavery from the territories whether 
or not he as a slaveholder would have it so. He surely did 
not permit prejudice to rule him in that decision. Mr. Cal-
houn did not become solicitous about the existence of slav-
ery until the Abolitionists of the North began to threaten 
slavery where it already had a foothold. He believed that 
slavery was a beneficent institution especially for states 
like South Carolina, No white person, according to his o-
pinion, could descend to manual labor. However, manufact-
uring and mechanical labor were not degrading and white 
people could easily indulge in such without lowering their 
standing and dignity. He believed that farming was one of 
the most excellent occupations of life and he as well as 
his father had often held the plough, but as for ordinary 
manual labor, no white person could descend to that. s o ci e"ty 
rr 
based on slavery was the best guarantee to equality among 
the whites. It produced an unvarying level among them. It 
not only did not excite but did not even admit of inequal-
ities by which aire white man could domineer over another." 
When Mr. Calhoun spoke about rights of the people he did 
not mean the colored slaves to be included as the recipients 
26 
of those privileges, such were Mr. Calhoun's views. 
His ideas of a political state were somewhat like those 
of Aristotle who had to deal with the problem of slavery. 
Adams' Memoirs, Vol. 5, p. 10. 
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also, and who wrote the first scientific discus/sion of the 
27 r 
institution in extant literature." Aristotle argued for 
slavery as a natural institution in the state. Mr. Cal-
houn believed that slavery was essential to South Carolina. 
I have entered into detail concerning his views on saai* 
ery to make all the plainer his liberal ideas of the ^power 
of the General Government over slavery in the territories. 
Calhoun was an expansionist. He favored the purchase 
of Florida and believed it would be a good thing for the 
South, especially. He favored bringing Cuba into the Unitefl. 
States even at the cost of a war with England if she meant 
to take that island. He believed that the passion for ag-
grandizement was the law paramount of man in society and he 
thought that there would be no separation of the U. S. if 
28 
we should make settlements on the Pacific coast,* He was 
in sympathy with the Monroe Doctrine, also. Sectionalism 
was an abhoranee to him. He was not considered a section-
alist at least till the Tariff discussion of 1828. He be-
lieved that the United States Bank would help bring about 
uniformity in our money system. He thought that internal 
# He later changed his liberal views. 
27, Dunning*s Political Theories, p. 58. 
28. Adams' Memoirs. Vol. 6, pp. 70, 138 and 251. 
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improvements would bind our country closer together and I 
believe he was right in advocating them for that reason. 
In his report to Congress Бес. 3, 1824, he wrote that our 
country as it then existed was naturally divided topograph­
ically into three parts—first the strip of territory along 
the Atlantic coast and back as far as the Allegheny Mountains 
second, the country in the region of the St. Lawrence and 
Great Lakes and third, the Great Mississippi Valley. The 
Act of Congress of April 30, 1824, authorized the President 
M
to cause the necessary surveys, plans and estimates to be 
made of the routes of such roads and canals as he may deem 
of mational importance in a commercial or military point of 
view, or necessary to the transportation of the public maib" 
In his report, Mr. Calhoun put special emphasis on the words 
"National Importance" and in determining what routes for 
roads and canals were of national importance, he adverted 
to the Constitution in its distribution of powers and dut­
ies between the General and state Governments. In thus re­
garding our system it was conceived that all these routes <f 
roads and canals which might be fairly considered as fall­
ing within the province of any particular state however 
useful they might be in a commercial or political view, or 
to the transportation of the mail, were excluded from the 
provisions of the act."^ 
29. wbihoun's Works, Vol. 5, pp 137­147. 
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Then what were routes of National Importance. They 
were the roads and canals that were to connect the three 
great sections of country just spoken of. A n example was 
the Cumberland Road begun in Mr.Jefferson»s Administration 
or a route for a canal from Washington D. C. by the Potomac 
to the Ohio River and on to Lake Erie. Mr. Calhoun though 
national in his tendency always recognized the constitution-
al rights of the state and had great respect for them. An 
intense sectionalist would not have cared to see the country 
bound together by routes of easy, travel and communication. 
He voted as has been said for a moderate protection 
to manufacturers in 1816, although his community was not a 
manufacturing state. He was not considered a sectionalist 
by his own state in 1823 for the South Carolina Legislature 
endorsed him for President because of his "distinguished 
talents", his devotion to the general administration,""his 
superiority to local views and sectional principles." The 
Resolution stated also other commendable featers of his pub-
lic carreer including "bis zeal and energy in promoting the 
30 
Declaration and prosecuting of our late war with Britain" 
After giving up his duties as Secretary of War Mr. Calttoun 
spent the summer in the gouth where he attended many public 
dinners given in his honor. His address at Augusta, Georgia, 
June 25, 1825, states plainly his views on sectionalism. He 
30. Niles' Register, Vol. 25, p. 243. 
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said, "80 one would reprobate more pointedly than myself, 
any concerted seism between states for interested or sec-
tional objects. I would consider all such concert as against 
the spirit of our constitution, which was intended to bind 
31 
all of the states in one common bond of union and friendshin 
Mr. Calhoun's record has mow been discussed in a brief 
way up to the year 1825. He had been in National political 
life nearly fifteen years. He helped with all his might thg 
war with Great Britain; He advocated a national bank, though 
he believed the power was the least clear of those given 
Congress by the Constitution, he voted for the Tariff of 
1816 because he realized and appreciated the circumstances 
of our country and its industries; he advocated internal 
improvements by the General Government acting within its 
constitutional power as he understood it; he was an expans-
ionist and he said Congress had the power to exclude slavery 
from the territories and lastly he was opposed to section-
alism. If he had died in 1825 he would not have been the 
"Nullifier" of History. We probably would not have heard s> 
much of his career but he undoubtedly would have been ranked 
along with statesmen of National tendencies. 
If Mr. Calhoun had been in Congress instead of in the 
office of Secretary of War, it would not be so difficult 
31, Nilee' Register, Vol. 28, p. 267. 
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to trace the changes in his attitude toward the tariff which 
more than any one public affair caused him to assume so 
doubtful and questionable a position in the eys of the Nat-
ionalists. Adams* Mermoirs throw some light on the problem 
but Mr. Adams was often prejudiced in his estimates of his 
contemporaries and consequently one must carefully sift the 
evidence found there. Mr. Monroe was inaugurated for a sec-
ond term, March 4, 1821 and he discussed the inaugural ad-
dress in a cabinet meeting two or three days before the in-
auguration. It is said that Monroe made some statements 
favorable to the manufacturing interests and that Mr. Cal-
houn objected to them. These expressions were then slight-
ly modified. 3 2 
This incident seems to show that Calhoun was becoming 
disatisfied with the increasing demands of the protectionist 
as early as 1821. Already his native state was beginning 
to grow uneasy and in December, 1820, the Legislature passed 
resolutions unfavorable to the tariff proposed at the pre-
ceding session of Congress. Mr. Monroe/f submitted his 
# 
last regular message to his cabinet for discussion and Mr. 
Calhoun again objected to an expression in the message which 
declared the agricultural, manufacturing and commercial int 
terests of the country to be in a flourishing condition. He 
^ Dec. 1824 
32. Adams 1 Memoirs, Vol. 5, p. 309 
33.. Niles 1 Register, Vol. 19, pp. 345-346. 
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said all the agriculture of the South was in a state of 
great depression never greater. He wished the gratulatory 
34 
tone of the message to be qualified. 
Here is what Monroe said in the message as submitted to 
Congress, December 7, 1824: "Our revenue under the mild 
system of impost and tonnage continues to be adequate to 
all the purposes of the government. Our agriculture, com-
35 
merce, manufactures and navigation flourish." whether 
Monroe made any change I have not been able to discover but 
from the message alone a stranger to our country could eas-
ily believe that what the President said would apply to the 
United States at large. 
According to Mr. Adams, Calhoun was a friend to intern-
al improvements all through the Monroe Administration and 
that the cause of internal improvements was constantly ac-
quiring strength until it culminated in the Act of April, 
1824. All this took place in spite of the opposition of 
Mr. Monroe.^ 3 6 
Ho doubt sentiment in the south was turning against 
the tariff especially and Internal Improvements by 1824, 
and objections in some quarters had been made against Cal-
houng because of his national tendencies in advocating Int-
# Monroe in 1822 vetoed a bill to repair and operate 
the Cumberland Road. 
34, Adams' Memoirs, Vol. 6, p. 432. 
35. Messages and Papers of the Presidents Vol.2,p.248. 
36» Adams' Memoirs, Vol. 8, p. 233. 
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ernal Improvements and a United States Bank. This was a 
presidential year and he evidently wanted to have the peop-
le's minds clear concerning his position on these great 
questions. He wrote a letter dated July 3, 1824 to Cong-
ressman Robert S. Garnett of Virginia explaining hiB ideas 
on the Constitution and answering some of the objections 
against him. As to the Constitution he believed in no set 
rule of construction. He believed that any passage must be 
constured according to the meaning of the framers of that 
instrument. He said he felt profound respect for the rights 
of the states. He in part further wrote: "For example, I 
am accused of advocating the power of Congress to incorpor-
ate a National Bank, but those who make the accusation, and 
who profess to admire Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson, seem 
to forget that I had the weight of authority with me." He 
pointed out the fact that Madison signed the Bank Bill of 
1816 and that Jefferson approved of a bill which extended a 
branch of the first Bank of the United States to New Orleans 
"I felt satisfied that the power existed but at the same 
time respected those who took the opposite view, for I have 
always considered the power the least clear of those which 
have been exercised by Congress. I rested the argument for 
its passage on the necessity of restoring specie payments 
at the time of the legal currency of the United States had 
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ceased to circulate, and to regulate, or to fix the value cf 
that which did circulate." He said that it was again ob-
jected to him that he was as friend to the system of intern-
al improvements. Here again he could cover himself by the 
same authority. Madison, Jefferson, and Monroe, again and 
again approved of bills for internal improvements.37 The 
grand exception for Madison of course was the bill he vetoed 
just before he left office in 1817, 
THerefore Mrs Calhoun in writing to a Virginia congress-
man pointed to the sons of Virginia as authority for what 
he did. I really believe, however, that Calhoun was more 
liberal than any one of the three especially on Internal 
Improvements,that his citations in that respect were a 
little Btretched probably for political purposes. It is 
noticeable that he says nothing about the tariff in this 
letter. 
In an address delivered at Abbeville, South Carolina, 
May 27, 1825, Mr. Calhoun revied his record while in Cong-
ress and did not repudiate a single great measure he sup-
ported. He said his community had nobly sustained all these 
measures. He was in the main correct. He said that his 
principles remained unchanged and in this new position his 
principles of action remained the same. 3 8 However, Calhoun 
37, Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 219-223. 
38, files' Register, Vol. 28, pp. 265-267. 
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and "his own state legislature were not exactly together on 
the question of Internal Improvements in 1825. On Jan. 13, 
1825, a few months "before this address was delivered the 
Senate of the State passed a resolution as follows: Resolved 
That congress does not possess the power, under the Consti-
tution, to adopt a general system of internal improvements, 
as a national measure." Another resolution of the same set 
39 
declared a protective tariff unconstitutional. These 
passed the Senate by a vote of 30 to 13 and a year later 
40 
they in substance passed both Houses. It is my belief trm 
the investigation that I have made that South Carolina as a 
state reached the point of definite opposition before Cal-
houn, himself, came out boldly. While Calhoun in the sum-
mer of 1825 is talking about his record in Congress and in 
the cabinet and the unsurpassed system of government, defin-
ite opposing sentiments are being uttered in South Carolina 
to the tariff and other issues that have played a prominent 
part in our national Government, As late as 1831, Calhoun 
said he had no doubt of the constitutionality of Internal 
Improvements within proper limits but as I have quoted be-
fore he believed an amendment necessary to place them on 
41 
a solid, permanent basis and he was right for an amend-
ment would have taken the subject largely out of controversy 
W. Niles' Register, Vol, 27, pp. 338-339. 
40. Hiles » Register, Vol. 29, p. 2f3. 
41. Calhoun's correspondence, pp. 296-297 
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By the close of 1820 Mr. Calhoun thought that the manuf-
42 
acturers were on a pretty firm foundation and this opinion 
joined with the objection that he made to that subject in 
Mr. Monroe's message makes it pretty certain that he favored 
no further increase in protection. His state opposed the 
proposed tariff of 1820 which was defeated in the Senate and 
from that time the Southern leaders opposed with all their 
strength the demands of the Protectionists. 
New Bngland was gradually changing from a "Tree Trade" 
section to a firm friend of protection. As the commercial 
and importing interests of New England lost comparative 
strength in the battle with the growing manufacturing int-
erests the votes of New England congressmen began to be cast 
for protection. This change of principle began to be evi-
dent by 1820, and when 1828 was reached that section was 
firmly allied with the protective tariff and together with 
the support of the Agricultural States of the West and Mid-
dle West made the protective principle paramount in the na-
tion. The details of the tariff controversy are very comp-
lex and "̂ ave no place in this paper but some phases of the 
subject will have to be noticed. 
The South was not receiving any manufacturing establish-
ments within its borders. The institution of slavery was 
42. Adams' Memoirs, Vol, 5, pp. 408-411. 
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in itself sufficient to keep out foreign immigration and 
free labor. The south was an agricultural country and as 
such desired to sell in the dearest markets and buy in the 
cheapest. Since no articles -̂ ere manufactured in that sec-
tion of the country it was necessary to buy the finished 
products either in Europe or the North, and if the manufact-
urers were protected, it meant that the prices of goods the 
South would have to buy would be raised with no correspond-
ing increase in the selling price of cotton. As Professor 
Taussig says "Cotton was not yet king and the South was not 
yet sure that its staple was indispensable for all the world 
While the export of cotton on a large scale had begun, it 
was feared that England, in retaliation for high duties on 
43 
English goods might tax or exclude American cotton." 
By 1824 the cotton industry was on a firm basis and was 
almost in an independent position but the woolen interests 
were still clamoring for recognition. In 1827 a bill to 
protect woolen goods was introduced in Congress. It recog-
nized the minimum principle which bad been applied to cot-
tons. This bill succeeded in getting through the House, but 
it was defeated by the casting vote of Mr. Calhoun who was 
President of the Senate. He had the power of life and death 
in his hands and dealt the protective principle a tempor-
43. Taussig's Tariff History, p. 73. 
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ary blow. 
This temporary defeat did not, however, discourage the 
friends of protection. In the summer of 1827 a convention 
was held at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. It was not only a con 
mention to discuss wool and woolens but it considered all 
the industries which were supposed to need protection. This 
gathering attracted the attention of the entire country and 
it was closely watched by the opponents of the Woolen Bill. 
The Vice-President wrote to James Edward Calhoun that 
summer his opinion on that convention and the tariff. He in 
part wrote: "The wisest men of the country have divided in 
opinion, how far Congress has the power and admitting they 
possess it, how far on principle, encouragement may be given 
to domestic manufactures as connected with the great consid-
eration of the defense and independence of the country. 
In the meantime the south has commenced with remonstrating 
against this unjust and oppressive attempt to sacrifice 
their interest; and I do trust, that they will not be pro-
voked to step beyond strict constitutional remedies. In 
this letter Calhoun characterized the Harrisburg Convention 
as a scheme and he further spoke of the geographical inter* 
eats of the country as not being sufficiently guarded. He 
felt that a government in order to be just must take into 
consideration all sections of the country. While a proteo-
44. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 247-251, 
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tive tariff might he of help and assistance to the North he 
felt and believed that it was an injury to South Carolina. 
In a letter written home May 4, 1828, from Washington, he 
said he felt confident it was one of the great instruments 
of their impoverishment and if persisted in must reduce 
them to poverty, or compel them to an entire change of in-
dustry. 4 5 When this last letter was written the Tariff of 
1828 was about to be passed and it was creating intense ex-
citement in South Carolina and Calhoun did not condemn this 
excitement. Do not believe that Calhoun was opposed to 
tariffs as tariffs. He did believe, however, in considering 
the circumstances of the case. Undoubtedly he was Influ-
enced by economic conditions. He believed and perhaps 
justly that the tariff was hurting his state by injuring the 
sale of its chief product and compelling it to pay far more 
than its share of the revenue to the General Government. 
If the operation of the tariff could have been suspended in 
South Carolina by the government no complaint would have 
come from the Southern leaders. Mr- Calhoun realized that 
this was the weak part of our system, the inability to make 
all laws give justice to all parts of the country at large. 
Mr. Calhoun in a letter to James Monroe, July 10, 1828, 
brings out his discontent concerning the unequal presure of 
45. Calhoun•s Correspondence, pp. 264-265. 
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the laws on all parts of the Union. He spoke of the feel-
ings which the tariff of that year had excited in South 
Carolina and the other Southern states, and the almost un-
iversal emharassment among the people of the staple states 
which they attributed to the tariff. He said, however, that 
their attachment to the Union remained unshaken as far as 
the great body of citizens were concerned. "Yet it cannot 
be disauised that the system pushed to the present extreme 
acta most unequally in its pressure on the several parts, 
which of necessity has a most pernicious tendency on the feel 
Ings of the oppressed portions. I greatly fear that the weak 
part of our system will be found to consist in the fact 
that in a country of such vast extent and diversity of int-
erest, many of th« laws,will be found to act very unequally 
and that some portions of the country may be enriched by 
legislation at the expense of others, it seems to me that 
we have no other check against abuses, but such as grow out 
of responsibility, or elections, and while this is an ef-
fectual check, where the law acts equally dn all, it is none 
in the case of the unequal action to which I refer. One 
thing seems to me certain, that the system is getting wrong 
and if a speedy and effective remedy be not applied a shock 
46 
at no long interval may be expected." 
46. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 266-267. 
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It was not many months after the foregoing letter that 
the South Carolina Exposition came forth and Calhoun was 
probably at that time preparing his draft of that memorable 
document. He realized that a grave and serious condition 
was confronting the country. He was fully aware of the sec-
tional nature of the controversy, and that it might lead to 
disunion, was in the minds of more than one man. Governor 
Taylor of gouth Carolina in an address delivered July 4th 
1828, recognized the tyranny of the tariff but he did not 
countenance disunion. He said unqualifiedly: "Shame on the 
47 
man that would encourage a disunion." 
Mr. Calhoun believed that a law which was unjust in its 
operation on any section of the country was not really in 
accordance with the spirit of our constitution and he be-
lieved that there was a constitutional remedy to protect a 
state against a tyrannical enactment. The extreme protect-
ionists had at last forced him to explain in an elaborate 
manner what he considered to be the constitutional rights of 
a state. In short, economic conditions had forced him to 
take a stand which has been so often misrepresented and mis-
understood. Calhoun was prophet and political student e-
nough to see that either disunion or a consolidated govern-
ment was in store for this country. He really despised 
47. Uiles* Register, Vol. 34, pp. 351-352« 
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both, possibilities and he set about to prepare an elaborate 
but plain exposition of our system or Constitution. Mr. 
Calhoun believed that our happiness and welfare as a nation 
depended on the observance of the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, and he put as much emphasis on the spirit as 
he did the letter. He loved and venerated the Constitution 
as the only sure foundation of our union. He loved and 
venerated the Union and desired to see it progress and pros-
per. He desired to save the Union, He did not want to de-
stroy it. However he did not want one section to dominate 
over the other. He did not desire to see one section pros-
per and grow rich at the expense of the other section by he}? 
of national enactments. He believed that the Union was for 
the welfare and happiness of all the states. He did not 
want to see a B^Lian League grow into an Athenian Empire, 
Hence his doctrine of interposition. He believed that if 
the states could not protect themselves that disunion was 
inevitable. To him the Union could be destroyed by consol-
idation as well as separation. To destroy the rights of the 
states and thereby give the Central Government the chief 
power would destroy our system as established by the consti-
tution. He did not desire to see consolidation any more 
than he wished to see separation, but he wanted to preserve 
the Union under the Constitution as he understood it and as 
he believed the framers intended. 
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It is not within my province to take up the Nullifica-
tion Controversy or to discuss the details of the south Car-
olina Exposition or the Disquisition on Government hut to 
bring out into relief his national characteristics. The 
nullification controversy has given Calhoun his place in 
history as far as the average reader of American History is 
concerned "but this great statesman would be done an injus-
tice to remember him only for that difficulty between jacksai 
and south Carolina. Mr. Calhoun affirmed again and again 
through all his political life in his correspondence and 
public addresses that he had always revered and loved the 
principles upon which Mr. Jefferson came into power in 1801 
and I believe he was sincere in his professions. 
Whatever hopes the state of south Carolina had in And-
rew Jackson were soon destroyed. Mr. Calhoun said he had 
no confidence in President Jackson whom he characterized as 
"too ignorant, too suspicious and too weak to conduct our 
4ft 
affairs successfully." ° He predicted failure for his ad-
ministration and he did not see how he could go through six 
years more. However, Jackson nevertheless served two terms, 
There was much trouble in store for Mr.Calhoun in jackson*8 
first term of office. It was then that the President came 
into the knowledge that Calhoun while secretary of War, had 
48. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 290-292. 
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favored a court-martial for him because of hie conduct in 
the Seminole Ware. This disclosure practically destroyed the 
South Carolinaian's chances tif reaching the Presidency. The 
Eaton affair also caused bitter feeling tetweeh the two 
men and the influence of Calhoun and gouth Carolina in the 
Administration came practically to the vanishing point. Cal-
houn's only respect for jackson was that he occupied the 
Presidents chair. 
When did Calhoun change from an advocate of broad nat-
ional policies to an open and clear supporter of State 
Rights? without question he was on the side of the latter 
by 1828, but there are indications of a change of heart be-
fore that time. I believe that he began to alter his views 
on the tariff about 1820 and that by 1824 he was opposed to 
ClaytB "American system." It was on the tariff question 
that he made the first break from his national character. 
50 
He was considered by John Quincy Adams 4 9 and Hiles * Register 
as the fttend of internal improvements all through his term 
of office in Monroe's Cabinet, but while he was Vice-Pres-
ident he began to doubt the power of the General Government 
to do anything definite along that line without and amend-
ment to the Constitution. According to Mr. Hunt, Calhoun 
did not object to a national policy as long as he saw his 
49. Adams' Memoirs, Vol, 8, p. 233. 
50. Niles' Register, Vol. 35, pp. 82-83. 
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state prospering under such laws but as soon as he was con-
vinced that such legislation was a positive detriment to 
his community he turned without reserve to State Rights. 
Mr. Calhoun realized the unequal pressure of the law on 
the various parts of the Union, and the tariff according to 
his f igures^was an excellent example of the unequal burden. 
There is no doubt that Mr. Calhoun desired to see every 
section of our country in a prosperous and happy condition 
but he believed that this condition would be impossible if 
a national law were made to cover all communities regard-
less of the special needs of certain sections of the country 
One can see that Calhoun was not necessarily ^LaiseeJU'aire" 
as far as this principle was concerned. He was aiming at a 
method to preserve the tariff for those who found it use-
ful and at the same time to make the tariff inoperative in 
those sections which found it disadvantageous and detri-
mental, nullification" was the effective remedy according 
to his view. He maintained and asserted the principle of 
State Rights acti to destroy the possibility of national 
measures but to make such measures most effective. If this 
principle of Calhoun had been carried out in its theoretical 
possibilities the Civil War would have been averted in all 
probability if it had not been for the moral awakening on 
the slavery question. 
51. Calhoun's Correspondence, p. «03. 
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The extreme abolitionists had no respect for theories ox-
Constitutional provisions which were meant to protect slav-
ery. They wanted it abolished on the principle that it was 
all wrong regardless of State Rights and the Constitution 
which had to give way to a so-called "higher law." Mr. Cal-
houn was a believer in the institution of slavery and he 
considered the abolitionists of the North nothing less than 
fanatics. At first thought it would be easy to think that 
he would have been pleased at Andrew jackson's proposal to 
have a National law passed excluding abolition literature 
from the mails but Mr. Calhoun, true to his theory of State 
Rights, maintained that it was a matter for the states to 
52 
judge. * He proposed a law to prohibit postmasters from re-
ceiving and sending literature of the abolitionists to a 
state where the circulation of such literature was forbid-
den by state law. With such a law abolition literature 
would never find its way into gouth Carolina or any other 
strong slave state. Under such a provision the peculiar 
institutions of a state would always be safe from dangerous 
reading matter coming in through the post office. Calhoun 
fully realized what he was advocating when he asserted 
State Rights. His proposal failed to become law. 
52. Calhoun's Works, Vol. 2, P. 533. 
53. Hunt's Calhoun, pp. 236-237, 
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After 1832 sectionalism is strong in Calhoun. It would 
have been impossible for him to be free from it while the 
Abolitionists were growing more fearless in their denuncia-
tions of the "peculiar institution" of the ^outh. Toward 
the end of jackson's administration Calhoun opposed the re-
chartering of the ^nited States Bank and became an advocate 
of Van Buren's Independent Treasury idea. On Sept. 7, 1837 
he wrote to James .Edward Calhoun that there was a fair op-
portunity to break the last of their commercial shackles and 
he said he meant the control which the North through the 
use of Government credit acting through the banks, has ex-
ercised over their industry and commerce. "I have taken my 
stand. I go against the chartering of a United States Bank, 
or any connection with Biddies or any other bankB." 5 4 He 
was practically of the same mind when he upheld Tyler's veto 
of the U.S. Bank bill. A friend of the Bank in 1816, he 
finally became its opponent when it asked for another lease 
of life. Yet in opposing the bank he showed a national 
spirit by supporting Van Buren's scheme of an independent 
treasury which the whigs opposed. 
As to internal improvements his later ideas are set 
forth in the Eeport of the Memphis Convention of 1845 in 
which he virtually declared that the General Government 
55 
could not build roads and canals. Whatever could possibly 
54, Calhoun's Correspondence, p. 377 
55. Hunt's Calhoun, p. 290. 
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be accomplished by individual effort and state enterprise 
was to be left to the states, but as has been noted he be-
lieved the Mississippi was too stupendous a task for any 
group of states to manage, consequently its improvement was 
clearly within the control of the General Government. 
Mr. Calhoun's Nationalism burst into flame once more whei 
he advocated the annexation of Texas. On December 25, 1843, 
he wrote to Thomas W. Gilmer the following words: "I believe 
the annexation of Texas to be necessary to the peace and 
security of both countries, and will be beneficial to the 
rest of the civilized world, including Mexico herself. That 
it is obviously so for Texas and the southern portion of 
our Union must be admitted by all who will calmly and fairly 
examine the subject. As to the other portions of our 
union North and Northwest, her anexation would open a wide 
and valuable market for their products, while in a political 
point of view it could not more than compensate for the vast 
extension opened to the non-slave holding states to the Pac-
ific on the line of the Oregon. The objection that it would 
extend our domestic institutions of the gouth must be met 
as a direct attack on the compromise of the Constitution, 
and the highest ground might be taken in opposition to it 
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on our part." Calhoun evidently wanted to maintain the 
56. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 559-560. 
46 
equal division of power .between the North and south by the 
Anexation of Texas but he did not believe that the admis-
sion of Texas would hurt the North in a commercial way. 
In the Presidential campaign of 1844, the Democratic 
party assumed the positive position of advocating the anex-
ation of Texas and the line of 54* 40' as the northern 
boundary of Oregon. The Democrats were successful and the 
result was considered a verdict to acquire Texas. In the 
meantime President Tyler had made Calhoun Secretary of State 
in March, 1844 to help bring about this very purpose of ac-
quiring Texas and before Mr. Tyler left office Texas had 
been annexed by joint resolution. 
Mr. Calhoun did not remain in the Cabinet to complete 
the Oregon negotiation. He wanted an amicable adjustment 
of the question with England. In fact he regarded Oregon 
as the really dangerous problem. He did not wish to see 
the American people get>too anxious to acquire all Oregon 
when they would probably acquire all of it in the future 
without a war with England. Calhoun on May 30, 1845, wrote 
to Mr.John y. Mason that he thought from the beginning that 
to be quiet, to do nothing, to excite attention, and leave 
time to operate, was the true policy,—the only one indeed 
by which we could secure the whole territory, and that the 
opposite not only involved the hazard of war, but the final 
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loss of the whole territory. 0 7 
Calhoun should he commended for his position on the Ore-
gon question. He saw the danger of plunging the United 
States into two wars at once with the chances of Great 
Britain»s gaining a stronger grasp on the American Cont-
inent as a result. The "Fifty-four, forty or fight" cry 
proved all right for the purposes of a pplitical party in 
getting votes, hut if such a cry had been put into operation 
the effects might have been extremely hurtful to our inter-
ests, on the Pacific coast for Great Britain did not have 
her hands tied hy any great war in 1845 as was the case in 
1812-14 when she was fighting Hapoleon. In 1846 Calhoun 
made a speech in the Senate (where he had returned once 
more in 1845) advocating 49 as the line instead of the 
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famous proposed boundary of 54 40 . The line of 49 proved 
to be the final adjustment and the question was settled hon-
orably and peacefully. 
When war broke out with Mexico in the spring of 1846 
He opposed the declaration of war. He believed hostilities 
were brought on unneccessarily by sending Taylor to occupy 
the disputed territory. When word came of a clash between 
the American and the Mexican soldiers Polk was eager for 
57. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 659-663. 
58. Appendix, Congressional Globe, Vol. 16, pp. 471-476 
war. Calhoun wanted time to investigate the circumstances. 
Time was not allowed and he refused to vote for the declara-
tion, "The precipitating / conflict of May, 1846, he in-
sisted, was not war, but merely a collision between troops 
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on the frontier." The gouth as a section heartily sup-
ported the contest with Mexico but Calhoun saw grave and 
serious dangers in a war, and his fears were expressed in a 
letter to Thomas Or* Clemson on July 30, 1846 when he wrote 
that he feared the war would be a pretext for renewing high 
protective duties. He said that it would offer an opportun-
ity for the display of patriotism and valor, but it would 
disclose our financial weakness, it would involve us in a 
heavy debt, it would give a strong central tendency to our 
system, it would prevent reform and greatly strengthen the 
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spoils principle. 0 Calhoun evidently feared that the war 
would bring on a train of evils injurious to the principles 
he had been fighting for in his public career, empecially 
since 1828. He believed that the institutions of the south 
(especially slavery and states rights) would not be safe 
even if the Mexican War should end gloriously with a large 
addition of territory to the Union, unless certain funda-
mental principles of our Constitution as he understood it, 
were preserved intact. 
59. Hunt's Calhoun, p. 288. 
60. Calhoun's Correspondence, pp. 702-703. 
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Calhoun was a Nationalist on the Oregon and Texas ques-
tions, although he did not manifest the aggressive war spir-
it of 1812. He saw that a large portion of the North was 
determined to keep all the territory acquired from Mexico 
free ground and he now maintained that Congress did not have 
the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories.61 In his 
correspondence with Palfcenham he had virtually come to the 
conclusion that the power of the General Government must be 
utilized to defend slavery. His attitude here has been 
characterized by saying that he "nationalized the slavery 
question." The South assumed this attitude in a definite 
manner when a more stringent fugitive slave law was enacted 
in 1850 by the National Government. 
The many knotty problems occasioned by the Mexican War, 
the demands of the abolisttonists and the uncertainty of the 
future tended to make Mr. Calhoun something of a pessimist 
in his last days. Secession talk among some Southerners 
was already prevalent in private circles. Calhoun did not 
indulge in the desire for disunion but he wanted to see the 
Union preserved on the principles which he firmly believed 
were the intentions of the framers of the Constitution. He 
did not believe in a brutal majority's overriding the rights 
of the minority. He realized that if the south was to stay 
in the Union, her peculiar institution must be guaranteed 
61. t4vu Hoist's Calhoun, p. 292 et seq. 
Hunt's Calhoun, p. 293. 
62. Calhoun's forks, Vol. 5, pp. 333-339. 
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protection. He did not want to see consolidation any more 
than he wanted to see disunion, hut if all remedies should 
fail to heal the diseases of our political system, then se-
cession would be the final step. That was Mr. Calhoun's 
position. Calhoun (according to his idea) was a good Union 
jkan but his idea of the Union was that a compact among sov-
ereign states and that idea was soon to be killed "by a ter-
rible Civil War. Calhoun did not wish to destroy the Union. 
He loved the Union but the force of circumstances was taking 
him along toward disunion although his brainy intellect had 
tried to impress upon the country a theory which he believed 
was the only hope of saving the Union. In all probability 
if he had been living in 1860 he would have joined the Se-
cession Movement but let us give the man credit for wanting 
to save the Union and for loving the Union as he understood 
it, Calhoun's Nationalism in the last analysis was not a 
nationalism that would bring about uniformity regardless of 
the special needs of a community but it was a Nationalism 
that recognized the diversity of interests of a large re-
public like ours. In theory Calhoun's idea was in a sense 
ideal, but fate linked his political philosophy with the 
slavery which was soon to be abolished and finally, Null-
ification, States Rights, and Slavery all went down to de-
struction together. But do not dismiss Calhoun with the 
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Sobriauet of "Nullifier". Let us remember the National 
measures be so ardently advocated and carried through. 
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